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Abstract
Sparse iterative methods, in particular first-order methods, are known to be among the most
effective in solving large-scale two-player zero-sum extensive-form games. The convergence rates
of these methods depend heavily on the properties of the distance-generating function that they
are based on. We investigate the acceleration of first-order methods for solving extensive-form
games through better design of the dilated entropy function—a class of distance-generating
functions related to the domains associated with the extensive-form games. By introducing a
new weighting scheme for the dilated entropy function, we develop the first distance-generating
function for the strategy spaces of sequential games that only a logarithmic dependence on the
branching factor of the player. This result improves the convergence rate of several first-order
methods by a factor of Ω(bdd), where b is the branching factor of the player, and d is the depth
of the game tree.
Thus far, counterfactual regret minimization methods have been faster in practice, and more
popular, than first-order methods despite their theoretically inferior convergence rates. Using
our new weighting scheme and practical tuning we show that, for the first time, the excessive
gap technique can be made faster than the fastest counterfactual regret minimization algorithm,
CFR+, in practice.
1 Introduction
Extensive-form games (EFGs) are a broad class of games; they model sequential interaction, imper-
fect information, and outcome uncertainty. Nash equilibria prescribe a particular notion of rational
behavior in such games. In the specific case of two-player zero-sum EFGs with perfect recall, an
exact Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time using a Linear Program (LP) whose
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size is linear in the size of the game tree [von Stengel, 1996]. However, in practice the LP approach
has two major drawbacks limiting its applicability. First, the LP may be prohibitively large and
may not fit in memory. Second, even when it does, the iterations of interior-point methods or the
simplex algorithm are prohibitively expensive [Sandholm, 2010]. Practical methods for EFG solving
tackle this issue through two complementary approaches: Abstraction and iterative game solvers
with low memory requirements [Sandholm, 2010]. In this paper we focus on the second approach.
Iterative game solvers mainly fall in two categories: (i) counterfactual-regret-based methods [Zinke-
vich et al., 2007, Lanctot et al., 2009] achieving a convergence rate on the order of O( 1
2
), and (ii)
first-order methods (FOMs) [Hoda et al., 2010, Kroer et al., 2015] achieving a convergence rate of
O(1 ). The better convergence rate of FOMs makes them more attractive from a theoretical view-
point. This paper investigates the acceleration of such FOMs for EFGs, from both a theoretical
and a numerical perspective.
Nash equilibrium computation of a two-player zero-sum EFG with perfect recall admits a Bilin-
ear Saddle Point Problem (BSPP) formulation where the domains are given by the polytopes that
encode strategy spaces of the players. The most efficient FOMs are designed to solve this BSPP.
The classical FOMs to solve BSPPs such as mirror prox (MP) [Nemirovski, 2004] or the excessive
gap technique (EGT) [Nesterov, 2005a] utilize distance-generating functions (DGFs) to measure
appropriate notions of distances over the domains. Then the convergence rate of these FOMs relies
on the DGFs and their relation to the domains in three critical ways: Through the strong convexity
parameters of the DGFs, the norm associated with the strong convexity parameter, and set widths
of the domains as measured by the DGFs.
Hoda et al. [2010] introduced a general framework for constructing DGFs for treeplexes—a class
of convex polytopes that generalize the domains associated with the strategy spaces of an EFG.
While they also established bounds on the strong convexity parameter for their DGFs in some
special cases, these lead to very weak bounds and result in slow convergence rates. Kroer et al.
[2015] developed explicit strong convexity-parameter bounds for entropy-based DGFs (a particular
subclass of DGFs) for general EFGs, and improved the bounds for the special cases considered
by Hoda et al. [2010]. These bounds from Kroer et al. [2015] generate the current state-of-the-art
parameters associated with the convergence rate for FOMs with O(1 ) convergence.
In this paper we construct a new weighting scheme for such entropy-based DGFs. This weighting
scheme leads to new and improved bounds on the strong convexity parameter associated with
general treeplex domains. In particular, our new bounds are first-of-their kind as they have no
dependence on the branching operation of the treeplex. Informally, our strong convexity result
allows us to improve the convergence rate of FOMs by a factor of Ω(bdd) (where b is the average
branching factor for a player and d is the depth of the EFG) compared to the prior state-of-the-art
results from Kroer et al. [2015]. Our bounds parallel the simplex case for matrix games where the
entropy function achieves a logarithmic dependence on the dimension of the simplex domain.
Finally, we complement our theoretical results with numerical experiments to investigate the
speed up of FOMs with convergence rate O(1 ) and compare the performance of these algorithms
with the premier regret-based methods CFR and CFR+ [Tammelin et al., 2015]. CFR+ is the
fastest prior algorithm for computing Nash equilibria in EFGs when the entire tree can be traversed
(rather than sampled). Bowling et al. [2015] used it to essentially solve the game limit Texas
hold’em.
CFR+ is also the algorithm used to accurately solve endgames in the Libratus agent, which
showed superhuman performance against a team of top Heads-Up No-Limit Texas hold’em poker
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specialist professional players in the Brains vs AI event 1. A slight variation2 of CFR+ was used
in the DeepStack agent Moravcˇ´ık et al. [2017], which beat a group of professional players. Our
experiments show that FOMs are substantially faster than both CFR algorithms when using a
practically tuned variant of our DGF. We also test the impact of stronger bounds on the strong
convexity parameter: we instantiate EGT with the parameters developed in this paper, and compare
the performance to the parameters developed by Kroer et al. [2015]. These experiments illustrate
that the tighter parameters developed here lead to better practical convergence rate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related research. We present
the general class of problems that we address—bilinear saddle-point problems—and describe how
they relate to EFGs in Section 3. Then Section 4 describes our optimization framework. Section 5
introduces treeplexes, the class of convex polytopes that define our domains of the optimization
problems. Our focus is on dilated entropy-based DGFs; we introduce these in Section 6 and present
our main results—bounds on the associated strong convexity parameter and treeplex diameter. In
Section 7 we demonstrate the use of our results on instantiating EGT. We compare our approach
with the current state-of-art in EFG solving and discuss the extent of theoretical improvements
achievable via our approach in Section 7.1. Section 8 presents numerical experiments testing the
effect of various parameters on the performance of our approach as well as comparing the perfor-
mance of our approach to CFR and CFR+. We close with a summary of our results and a few
compelling further research directions in Section 9.
2 Related work
Nash equilibrium computation has received extensive attention in the literature [Littman and Stone,
2003, Lipton et al., 2003, Gilpin and Sandholm, 2007, Zinkevich et al., 2007, Daskalakis et al.,
2009, Jiang and Leyton-Brown, 2011, Kroer and Sandholm, 2014, Daskalakis et al., 2015]. The
equilibrium-finding problems vary quite a bit based on their characteristics; here we restrict our
attention to two-player zero-sum sequential games.
Koller et al. [1996] present an LP whose size is linear in the size of the game tree. This ap-
proach, coupled with lossless abstraction techniques, was used to solve Rhode-Island hold’em [Shi
and Littman, 2002, Gilpin and Sandholm, 2007], a game with 3.1 billion nodes (roughly size 5 · 107
after lossless abstraction). However, for games larger than this, the resulting LPs tend to not fit
in the computer memory thus requiring approximate solution techniques. These techniques fall
into two categories: iterative -Nash equilibrium-finding algorithms and game abstraction tech-
niques [Sandholm, 2010].
The most popular iterative Nash equilibrium algorithm is the counterfactual-regret-minimization
framework instantiated with regret matching (CFR) [Zinkevich et al., 2007], its sampling-based vari-
ant monte-carlo CFR (MCCFR) [Lanctot et al., 2009], and CFR instantitated with a new regret
minimization technique called regret matching plus (CFR+). These regret-minimization algorithms
perform local regret-based updates at each information set. Despite their slow convergence rate of
O( 1
2
), they perform very well in pratice, especially CFR+. Recently, Waugh and Bagnell [2015]
showed, with some caveats, an interpretation of CFR as a FOM with O( 1
2
) rate. Nonetheless,
in this paper we make a distinction between regret-based methods and O(1 ) FOMs for ease of
exposition.
Hoda et al. [2010] initially proposed DGFs for EFGs leading to O(1 ) convergence rate when
used with EGT. Kroer et al. [2015] improved these result for the dilated entropy function. Gilpin
1Confirmed through author communication
2This variation was chosen for implementation reasons, though, and has inferior practical iteration complexity.
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et al. [2012] give an algorithm with convergence rate O(ln(1 )). Their bound has a dependence on
a certain condition number of the payoff matrix, which is difficult to estimate; and as a result they
show a bound of O(1 ) which is independent of the condition number. Detailed comparisons to all
three algorithms discussed here are given in Section 7.1.
Finally, Bosansky et al. [2014] develop an iterative double-oracle algorithm for exact equilibrium
computation. This algorithm only scales for games where it can identify an equilibrium of small
support, and thus suffers from the same performance issues as the general LP approach.
In addition to equilibrium-finding algorithms, another central topic in large-scale game solving
has been automated abstraction [Sandholm, 2010, 2015]. Initially, this was used mostly for infor-
mation abstraction [Gilpin and Sandholm, 2007, Shi and Littman, 2002, Zinkevich et al., 2007].
Lately, action abstraction approaches have gained considerable interest [Hawkin et al., 2011, 2012,
Brown and Sandholm, 2014, Kroer and Sandholm, 2014, 2016]. Sequential game abstraction ap-
proaches with solution quality bounds have also emerged for stochastic [Sandholm and Singh, 2012]
and extensive-form [Lanctot et al., 2012, Kroer and Sandholm, 2014, 2016] games more recently.
3 Problem setup
Computing a Nash equilibrium in a two-player zero-sum EFG with perfect recall can be formulated
as a Bilinear Saddle Point Problem (BSPP):
min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
〈x,Ay〉 = max
y∈Y
min
x∈X
〈x,Ay〉. (1)
This is known as the sequence-form formulation [Romanovskii, 1962, Koller et al., 1996, von Stengel,
1996]. In this formulation, x and y correspond to the nonnegative strategy vectors for players 1
and 2 and the sets X ,Y are convex polyhedral reformulations of the sequential strategy space of
these players. Here X ,Y are defined by the constraints Ex = e, Fy = f , where each row of E,F
encodes part of the sequential nature of the strategy vectors, the right hand-side vectors e, f are
|I1| , |I2|-dimensional vectors, and Ii is the information sets for player i. For a complete treatment
of this formulation, see von Stengel [1996].
Our theoretical developments mainly exploit the treeplex domain structure and are independent
of other structural assumptions resulting from EFGs. Therefore, we describe our results for general
BSPPs. We follow the presentation and notation of Juditsky and Nemirovski [2011a,b] for BSPPs.
For notation and presentation of treeplex structure, we follow Kroer et al. [2015].
3.1 Basic notation
We let 〈x, y〉 denote the standard inner product of vectors x, y. Given a vector x ∈ Rn, we let ‖x‖p
denote its `p norm given by ‖x‖p := (
∑n
i=1 |xi|p)1/p for p ∈ [1,∞) and ‖x‖∞ := maxi∈[n] |xi| for
p = ∞. Throughout this paper, we use Matlab notation to denote vector and matrices, i.e., [x; y]
denotes the concatenation of two column vectors x, y. For a given set Q, we let ri (Q) denote its
relative interior. Given n ∈ N, we denote the simplex ∆n := {x ∈ Rn+ :
∑n
i=1 xi = 1}.
4 Optimization setup
In its most general form a BSPP is defined as
Opt := max
y∈Y
min
x∈X
φ(x, y), (S)
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where X ,Y are nonempty convex compact sets in Euclidean spaces Ex,Ey and φ(x, y) = υ +
〈a1, x〉+ 〈a2, y〉+ 〈y,Ax〉. We let Z := X × Y; so φ(x, y) : Z → R. In the context of EFG solving,
φ(x, y) is simply the inner product given in (1).
The BSPP (S) gives rise to two convex optimization problems that are dual to each other:
Opt(P ) = minx∈X [φ(x) := maxy∈Y φ(x, y)] (P ),
Opt(D) = maxy∈Y [φ(y) := minx∈X φ(x, y)] (D),
with Opt(P ) = Opt(D) = Opt. It is well known that the solutions to (S) — the saddle points of
φ on X × Y — are exactly the pairs z = [x; y] comprised of optimal solutions to the problems (P )
and (D). We quantify the accuracy of a candidate solution z = [x; y] with the saddle point residual
sad(z) := φ(x)− φ(y) =
[
φ(x)−Opt(P )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+
[
Opt(D)− φ(y)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
.
In the context of EFG, sad(z) measures the proximity to being an -Nash equilibrium.
4.1 General framework for FOMs
Most FOMs capable of solving BSPP (S) are quite flexible in terms of adjusting to the geometry
of the problem characterized by the domains X ,Y of the BSPP (S). The following components are
standard in forming the setup for such FOMs (we present components for X , analogous components
are used for Y):
• Vector norm: ‖ · ‖X on the Euclidean space E where the domain X of (S) lives, along with
its dual norm ‖ζ‖∗X = max‖x‖X≤1〈ζ, x〉.
• Matrix norm: ‖A‖ = maxy {‖Ay‖∗X : ‖y‖Y = 1} based on the vector norms ‖ · ‖X , ‖ · ‖Y .
• Distance-Generating Function (DGF): A function ωX (x) : X → R, which is convex and
continuous on X , and admits a continuous selection of subgradients ω′X (x) on the set X ◦ :=
{x ∈ X : ∂ωX (x) 6= ∅} (here ∂ωX (x) is a subdifferential of ωX taken at x), and is strongly
convex with modulus ϕX w.r.t. the norm ‖ · ‖X :
∀x′, x′′ ∈ X ◦ : 〈ω′X (x′)− ω′X (x′′), x′ − x′′〉 ≥ ϕX ‖x′ − x′′‖2X . (2)
• Bregman distance: V (u‖x) := ωX (u)− ωX (x)− 〈ω′X (x), u− x〉 for all x ∈ X ◦ and u ∈ X .
• Prox-mapping : Given a prox center x ∈ X ◦,
Proxx(ξ) := argmin
u∈X
{〈ξ, u〉+ V (u‖x)} : E→ X ◦.
For properly chosen stepsizes, the prox-mapping becomes a contraction. This is critical in
the convergence analysis of FOMs. Furthermore, when the DGF is taken as the squared `2
norm, the prox mapping becomes the usual projection operation of the vector x− ξ onto X .
• ω-center : xω := argmin
x∈X
ωX (x) ∈ X ◦ of X .
• Set width: Ωx := max
x∈X
V (x‖xω) ≤ max
x∈X
ωX (x)−min
x∈X
ωX (x).
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The distance-generating functions ωX , ωY can be used to create smoothed approximations to
φ, φ as follows [Nesterov, 2005b]:
φµ2(x) = maxy∈Y
{φ(x, y)− µ2ωY(y)} , (3)
φ
µ1
(y) = min
x∈X
{φ(x, y) + µ1ωX (x)} , (4)
where µ1, µ2 > 0 are smoothness parameters denoting the amount of smoothing applied. Let yµ2(x)
and xµ1(y) refer to the y and x values attaining the optima in (3) and (4). These can be thought
of as smoothed best responses. Nesterov [2005b] shows that the gradients of the functions φµ2(x)
and φ
µ1
(y) exist and are Lipschitz continuous. The gradient operators and Lipschitz constants are
given as follows
∇φµ2(x) = a1 +Ayµ2(x) and ∇φµ1(y) = a2 +A
>xµ1(y),
L1
(
φµ2
)
=
‖A‖2
ϕYµ2
and L2
(
φ
µ1
)
=
‖A‖2
ϕXµ1
.
Based on this setup, we formally state the Excessive Gap Technique (EGT) of Nesterov [2005a] in
Algorithm 1.
ALGORITHM 1: EGT
input : ω-center zω, DGF weights µ1, µ2,
and  > 0
output: zt(= [xt; yt])
x0 = Proxxω
(
µ−11 ∇φµ2(xω)
)
;
y0 = yµ2(xω);
t = 0; z1 := zω;
while sad(z
t) >  do
τt =
2
t+3 ;
if t is even then
(µt+11 , x
t+1, yt+1) =
Step(µt1, µ
t
2, x
t, yt, τ)
else
(µt+12 , y
t+1, xt+1) =
Step(µt2, µ
t
1, y
t, xt, τ)
end
t = t+ 1;
end
ALGORITHM 2: Step
input : µ1, µ2, x, y, τ
output: µ+1 , x+, y+
xˆ = (1− τ)x+ τxµ1(y);
y+ = (1− τ) y + τyµ2(xˆ);
x˜ =
Proxxµ1 (y)
(
τ
(1−τ)µ1∇φµ2(xˆ)
)
;
x+ = (1− τ)x+ τ x˜;
µ+1 = (1− τ)µ1;
The EGT algorithm alternates between taking steps focused on X and Y. Algorithm 2 shows
a single step focused on X . Steps focused on y are completely analogous. Algorithm 1 shows how
the alternating steps and stepsizes are computed, as well as how initial points are selected.
Suppose the initial values µ1, µ2 in the EGT algorithm satisfy µ1 =
ϕX
L1(φµ2 )
. Then, at every
iteration t ≥ 1 of the EGT algorithm, the corresponding solution zt = [xt; yt] satisfies xt ∈ X ,
yt ∈ Y, and
φ(xt)− φ(yt) = sad(zt) ≤ 4‖A‖
T + 1
√
ΩXΩY
ϕXϕY
.
Consequently, [Nesterov, 2005a] proves that the EGT algorithm has a convergence rate of O(1 ).
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5 Treeplexes
Hoda et al. [2010] introduce the treeplex, a class of convex polytopes that encompass the sequence-
form description of strategy spaces in perfect-recall EFGs.
Definition 1. Treeplexes are defined recursively:
1. Basic sets: The standard simplex ∆m is a treeplex.
2. Cartesian product: If Q1, . . . , Qk are treeplexes, then Q1 × · · · ×Qk is a treeplex.
3. Branching: Given a treeplex P ⊆ [0, 1]p, a collection of treeplexes Q = {Q1, . . . , Qk} where
Qj ⊆ [0, 1]nj , and l = {l1, . . . , lk} ⊆ {1, . . . , p}, the set defined by
P l Q :=
{
(u, q1, . . . , qk) ∈ Rp+
∑
j nj : u ∈ P, q1 ∈ ul1 ·Q1, . . . , qk ∈ ulk ·Qk
}
is a treeplex. In this setup, we say ulj is the branching variable for the treeplex Qj .
A treeplex is a tree of simplexes where children are connected to their parents through the
branching operation. In the branching operation, the child simplex domain is scaled by the value of
the parent branching variable. Understanding the treeplex structure is crucial because the proofs
of our main results rely on induction over these structures. For EFGs, the simplexes correspond
to the information sets of a single player and the whole treeplex represents that player’s strat-
egy space. The branching operation has a sequential interpretation: The vector u represents the
decision variables at certain stages, while the vectors qj represent the decision variables at the k
potential following stages, depending on external outcomes. Here k ≤ p since some variables in u
may not have subsequent decisions. For treeplexes, von Stengel [1996] has suggested a polyhedral
representation of the form Eu = e where the matrix E has its entries from {−1, 0, 1} and the vector
e has its entries in {0, 1}.
For a treeplex Q, we denote by SQ the index set of the set of simplexes contained in Q (in
an EFG SQ is the set of information sets belonging to the player). For each j ∈ SQ, the treeplex
rooted at the j-th simplex ∆j is referred to as Qj . Given vector q ∈ Q and simplex ∆j , we let Ij
denote the set of indices of q that correspond to the variables in ∆j and define qj to be the sub
vector of q corresponding to the variables in Ij . For each simplex ∆j and branch i ∈ Ij , the set Dij
represents the set of indices of simplexes reached immediately after ∆j by taking branch i (in an
EFG Dij is the set of potential next-step information sets for the player). Given a vector q ∈ Q,
simplex ∆j , and index i ∈ Ij , each child simplex ∆k for every k ∈ Dij is scaled by qi. Conversely,
for a given simplex ∆j , we let pj denote the index in q of the parent branching variable qpj that ∆
j
is scaled by. We use the convention that qpj = 1 if Q is such that no branching operation precedes
∆j . For each j ∈ SQ, dj is the maximum depth of the treeplex rooted at ∆j , that is, the maximum
number of simplexes reachable through a series of branching operations at ∆j . Then dQ gives the
depth of Q. We use bjQ to identify the number of branching operations preceding the j-th simplex
in Q. We will say that a simplex j such that bjQ = 0 is a root simplex.
Figure 1 illustrates an example treeplex Q. Q is constructed from nine two-to-three-dimensional
simplexes ∆1, . . . ,∆9. At level 1, we have two root simplexes, ∆1,∆2, obtained by a Cartesian
product (denoted by ×). We have maximum depths d1 = 2, d2 = 1 beneath them. Since there
are no preceding branching operations, the parent variables for these simplexes ∆1 and ∆2 are
qp1 = qp2 = 1. For ∆
1, the corresponding set of indices in the vector q is I1 = {1, 2}, while for
∆2 we have I2 = {3, 4, 5}. At level 2, we have the simplexes ∆3, . . . ,∆7. The parent variable of
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∆3 is qp3 = q1; therefore, ∆
3 is scaled by the parent variable qp3 . Similarly, each of the simplexes
∆3, . . . ,∆7 is scaled by their parent variables qpj that the branching operation was performed on.
So on for ∆8 and ∆9 as well. The number of branching operations required to reach simplexes
∆1,∆3 and ∆8 is b1Q = 0, b
3
Q = 1 and b
8
Q = 2, respectively.
∆1
q2 ·∆4
q8 q9
q1 ·∆3
q7 ·∆9
q19 q20
q7 ·∆8
q16
q17
q18
q6 q7
q1 q2
∆2
q5 ·∆7
q14 q15
q4 ·∆6
q12 q13
q3 ·∆5
q10 q11
q3
q4
q5
×
×
Figure 1: An example treeplex constructed from 9 simplexes. Cartesian product operation is
denoted by ×.
Note that we allow more than two-way branches; hence our formulation follows that of Kroer
et al. [2015] and differs from that of Hoda et al. [2010]. As discussed in Hoda et al. [2010], it is
possible to model sequence-form games by treeplexes that use only two-way branches. Yet, this
can cause a large increase in the depth of the treeplex, thus leading to significant degradation in
the strong convexity parameter. Because we handle multi-way branches directly in our framework,
our approach is more effective in taking into account the structure of the sequence-form game and
thereby resulting in better bounds on the associated strong convexity parameters and thus overall
convergence rates.
Our analysis requires a measure of the size of a treeplex Q. Thus, we define MQ := maxq∈Q ‖q‖1.
In the context of EFGs, suppose Q encodes player 1’s strategy space; then MQ is the maximum
number of information sets with nonzero probability of being reached when player 1 has to follow
a pure strategy while the other player may follow a mixed strategy. We also let
MQ,r := max
q∈Q
∑
j∈SQ:bjQ≤r
‖qj‖1. (5)
Intuitively, MQ,r gives the maximum value of the `1 norm of any vector q ∈ Q after removing the
variables corresponding to simplexes that are not within r branching operations of the root of Q.
Example 1. In order to illustrate MQ and compare it to the size of |SQ|, let us now consider
an example of an EFG and its corresponding treeplexes. Consider a game where two players take
turns choosing among k actions, and each player chooses actions d times before leaf nodes are
reached. In the treeplex Q of Player 1, each time Player 1 chooses among k actions constitutes a
size k branching operation, and every time Player 2 chooses among k actions constitutes a size k
Cartesian product operation. The total dimensionality of the treeplex, |SQ|, is k2d, while the value
of MQ is k
d (since only Cartesian products blow up). Thus, MQ is square root of the size of |SQ|.
6 Dilated entropy functions with bounded strong convexity
In this section we introduce DGFs for domains with treeplex structures and establish their strong
convexity parameters with respect to a given norm (see (2)).
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The basic building block in our construction is the entropy DGF given by ωe(z) =
∑n
i=1 zi log(zi),
for the simplex ∆n. It is well-known that ωe(·) is strongly convex with modulus 1 with respect to
the `1 norm on ∆n (see Juditsky and Nemirovski [2011a]). We will show that a suitable modification
of this function achieves a desirable strong convexity parameter for the treeplex domain.
The treeplex structure is naturally related to the dilation operation [Hiriart-Urruty and Lemare´chal,
2001] defined as follows: Given a compact set K ⊆ Rd and a function f : K → R, we first define
K¯ :=
{
(t, z) ∈ Rd+1 : t ∈ [0, 1] , z ∈ t ·K
}
.
Definition 2. Given a function f(z), the dilation operation is the function f¯ : K¯ → R given by
f¯(z, t) =
{
t · f(z/t) if t > 0
0 if t = 0
.
The dilation operation preserves convexity, and thus we define the following convex function by
dilating the entropy function over the simplexes of a treeplex:
Definition 3. Given a treeplex Q and weights βj > 0 for each j ∈ SQ, we define the dilated entropy
function as
ω(q) =
∑
j∈SQ
βj
∑
i∈Ij
qi log
qi
qpj
for any q ∈ Q,
where we follow the treeplex notation and pj is the index of the branching variable preceding ∆
j ,
with the convention that qpj = 1 if ∆
j has no branching operation preceding it.
Remark 1. Note that the dilated entropy function ω(·) defined above is twice differentiable in the
relative interior of treeplex Q and admits a continuous gradient selection. Moreover, for weights βj
that scale appropriately with depth dj, we will demonstrate that it is strongly convex w.r.t. the `1
norm. Thus, the dilated entropy function is compatible with the `1 norm, as required by the BSPP
setup.
We would also like the prox-mapping associated with our DGF to be efficiently computable.
Hoda et al. [2010] show that for any dilated function, its prox operator on a treeplex can be easily
computed through a recursive bottom-up traversal involving the prox mappings associated with the
function being dilated on individual simplexes. Since the entropy prox function can be computed
in closed form on a simplex, the dilated entropy function can be computed by a single treeplex
traversal involving closed-form expressions on each simplex.
Definition 3 above leads to a subset of the DGFs considered by Hoda et al. [2010]. Our main
theoretical result shows that by a careful selection of the weights βj , we can significantly improve
the strong convexity bounds associated with the dilated entropy function. We will consider weights
that satisfy the following recurrence:
αj = 1 + max
i∈Ij
∑
k∈Dij
αkβk
βk − αk , ∀j ∈ SQ,
βj > αj , ∀i ∈ Ij and ∀j ∈ SQ s.t. bjQ > 0,
βj = αj , ∀i ∈ Ij and ∀j ∈ SQ s.t. bjQ = 0.
(6)
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Intuitively, αj represents the negative terms that the weight βj has to cancel out: the constant 1
represents the negative term resulting from the squared norm in the strong convexity requirement;
the summation term represents the amount of negative terms accumulated from the induction on
simplexes descending from simplex j. The qualifications on βj ensure that βj is set such that it at
least cancels out the negative terms; the difference βj − αj controls the amount of negative value
the parent simplex has to make up. This is why we set βj = αj when b
j
Q = 0. As part of the proof
of Lemma 2 we will see why we require a strict inequality βj > αj for non-root simplexes.
Based on recurrence (6), our main results establish strong convexity of our dilated entropy DGF
w.r.t. the `2 and `1 norms:
Theorem 1. For a treeplex Q, the dilated entropy function with weights satisfying recurrence (6)
is strongly convex with modulus 1 with respect to the `2 norm.
Theorem 2. For a treeplex Q, the dilated entropy function with weights satisfying recurrence (6)
is strongly convex with modulus 1MQ with respect to the `1 norm.
We give the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 in Section 6.2. Based on Theorem 2, we get the
following corollary:
Corollary 1. For a treeplex Q, the dilated entropy function with weights βj = 2+
∑dj
r=1 2
r(MQj ,r−1)
for all j ∈ SQ is strongly convex with modulus 1MQ w.r.t. the `1 norm.
Corollary 1 follows easily from Theorem 2 and a recursive interpretation of the weights, which
is presented as Fact 2 in the next section. In particular, a specific choice of weights in Fact 2
immediately satisfies the recurrence (6) and leads to Corollary 1.
To our knowledge, the best strong convexity bounds for general treeplexes were proved in Kroer
et al. [2015]. Using weights βj = 2
djMQj they show strong convexity modulus
1
|SQ| w.r.t. the `1
norm. Corollary 1 improves the prior bounds by exchanging a factor of |SQ| with a factor of MQ.
Note that |SQ| is tied to the branching factor associated with branching operations in the treeplex
Q whereas MQ is not. Thus, our result removes the dependence of the strong convexity parameter
on the branching factor and hence significantly improves upon Kroer et al. [2015].
In Theorem 3 we use our strong convexity result to establish a polytope diameter that has only
a logarithmic dependence on the branching factor. As a consequence, the associated dilated entropy
DGF when used in FOMs such as MP and EGT for solving EFGs leads to the same improvement
in their convergence rate.
6.1 Preliminary results for the proofs of our main results
We start with some simple facts and a few technical lemmas that are used in our proofs.
Fact 1. Given a treeplex Q, we have, respectively, for all i ∈ Ij , j ∈ SQ and all d = 1, . . . , dQ, q ∈ Q:
(a) MQj ≥ 1 +
∑
l∈Dij
MQl , (b) MQ ≥
∑
j∈SQ:dj=d
qpjMQj .
Proof. The first inequality was established in Kroer et al. [2015, Lemma 5.7]. The second follows
by using MQ =
∑
j qi for some q, and inductively replacing terms belonging to simplexes j at the
bottom with MQj . The result follows because branching operations cancel out by summing to 1.
10
Our next observation follows from Fact 1(a) and is advantageous in suggesting a practically
useful choice of the weights βj that can be used for Theorem 2 to arrive at Corollary 1.
Fact 2. Let Q be a treeplex and βj = 2 +
∑dj
r=1 2
r(MQj ,r − 1) for all j ∈ SQ as in Corollary 1.
Then Fact 1(a) implies βj ≥ 2 +
∑
k∈Dij 2βk, ∀i ∈ Ij and ∀j ∈ SQ.
Consequently, by selecting βj = 2αj , and αj = 1 +
∑dj
r=1 2
r−1(MQj ,r − 1) for all i ∈ Ij and for
all j ∈ SQ such that bjQ > 0, we immediately satisfy the conditions of the recurrence in (6).
Given a twice differentiable function f , we let ∇2f(z) denote its Hessian at z. Our analysis is
based on the following sufficient condition for strong convexity of a twice differentiable function:
Fact 3. A twice-differentiable function f is strongly convex with modulus ϕ with respect to a norm
‖ · ‖ on nonempty convex set C ⊂ Rn if h>∇2f(z)h ≥ ϕ‖h‖2, ∀h ∈ Rn, z ∈ C◦.
For simplexes ∆j at depth 1, there is no preceding branching operation; so the variables hpj , qpj
do not exist. We circumvent this with the convention hpj = 0, qpj = 1 for such j ∈ SQ.
In our proofs we will use the following expression for h>∇2ω(q)h.
Lemma 1. Given a treeplex Q and a dilated entropy function ω(·) with weights βj > 0, we have
h>∇2ω(q)h =
∑
j∈SQ
βj
∑
i∈Ij
(
h2i
qi
− 2hihpj
qpj
)
+
h2pj
qpj
 ∀q ∈ ri (Q) and ∀h ∈ Rn. (7)
We provide the proof of Lemma 1 in the appendix. It simply follows from taking the second-
order partial derivatives and rearranging terms.
6.2 Proofs of our main theorems
The majority of the work for our strong-convexity results is performed by the following lemma,
from which our strong convexity results follow easily.
Lemma 2. For any treeplex Q, the dilated entropy function with weights satisfying recurrence (6)
satisfies the following inequality:
h>∇2ω(q)h ≥
∑
j∈SQ
∑
i∈Ij
h2i
qi
∀q ∈ ri (Q) and ∀h ∈ Rn. (8)
Proof. We will first show the following inductive hypothesis over the set of non-root simplexes
ŜQ =
{
j ∈ SQ : bjQ > 0
}
for any depth d ≥ 0:
∑
j∈ŜQ:dj≤d
βj
∑
i∈Ij
(
h2i
qi
− 2hihpj
qpj
)
+
h2pj
qpj
− ∑
j∈ŜQ:dj≤d
∑
i∈Ij
h2i
qi
≥ −
∑
j∈ŜQ:dj=d
βjαj
βj − αj
h2pj
qpj
We begin with the inductive step, as the base case will follow from the same logic. Consider a
treeplex Q of depth d > 0. By applying the inductive hypothesis we have
∑
j∈ŜQ:dj≤d
βj
∑
i∈Ij
(
h2i
qi
− 2hihpj
qpj
)
+
h2pj
qpj
− ∑
j∈ŜQ:dj≤d
∑
i∈Ij
h2i
qi
≥
∑
j∈ŜQ:dj=d
βj
∑
i∈Ij
(
h2i
qi
− 2hihpj
qpj
)
+
h2pj
qpj
− ∑
j∈ŜQ:dj=d
∑
i∈Ij
h2i
qi
−
∑
j∈ŜQ:dj=d−1
βjαj
βj − αj
h2pj
qpj
(9)
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Now we can rearrange terms: The sum over j ∈ ŜQ such that dj = d−1 is equivalent to a sum over
the immediate descendant information sets k ∈ Dij inside the square brackets, and we can move
the sum over i ∈ Ij outside the square brackets by using the fact that
∑
i∈Ij
qi
qpj
= 1 and splitting
the term
h2pj
qpj
into separate terms multiplied by qiqpj
, this gives
(9) =
∑
j∈ŜQ:dj=d
∑
i∈Ij

βj − 1− ∑
k∈Dij
βkαk
βk − αk
 h2i
qi
−
(
2βjhihpj
qpj
)
+
qiβjh
2
pj
q2pj

≥
∑
j∈ŜQ:dj=d
∑
i∈Ij
[
(βj − αj) h
2
i
qi
−
(
2βjhihpj
qpj
)
+
qiβjh
2
pj
q2pj
]
, (10)
where the last inequality follows from the definition of αj .
For indices j ∈ SQ such that bjQ > 0 and i ∈ Ij , the relations in (6) imply βj > αj , and so the
expression inside the square brackets in (10) is a convex function of hi. Taking its derivative w.r.t.
hi and setting it to zero gives hi =
βj
βj−αj
qi
qpj
hpj . Thus, we arrive at
(10) ≥
∑
j∈ŜQ:dj=d
∑
i∈Ij
[
β2j
βj − αj
qih
2
pj
q2pj
− β
2
j
βj − αj
2qih
2
pj
q2pj
+
qiβjh
2
pj
q2pj
]
=
∑
j∈ŜQ:dj=d
h2pj
qpj
[( −β2j
βj − αj + βj
)∑i∈Ij qi
qpj
]
= −
∑
j∈ŜQ:dj=d
βjαj
βj − αj
h2pj
qpj
.
Hence, the induction step is complete. For the base case d = 0 we do not need the inductive
assumption: Because Dij = ∅, αj = 1, and we get (10) by definition; we can then apply the same
convexity argument. This proves our inductive hypothesis.
Then using Lemma 1, we now have
h>∇2ω(q)h−
∑
j∈SQ
∑
i∈Ij
h2i
qi
=
∑
j∈SQ
βj
∑
i∈Ij
(
h2i
qi
− 2hihpj
qpj
)
+
h2pj
qpj
− ∑
j∈SQ
∑
i∈Ij
h2i
qi
≥
∑
j∈SQ:bjQ=0
∑
i∈Ij
βj
h2i
qi
−
∑
k∈Dij
βkαk
βk − αk
h2i
qi
− h
2
i
qi
 ≥ 0.
The first inequality follows from the fact that hpj = 0 for all j ∈ SQ such that bjQ = 0, and for all
j ∈ SQ such that bjQ > 0, we used our induction. The last inequality follows from (6) and qi, h2i ≥ 0.
This then proves (8).
We are now ready to prove our two main theorems, which we restate before proving them.
Theorem 1. For a treeplex Q, the dilated entropy function with weights satisfying recurrence (6)
is strongly convex with modulus 1 with respect to the `2 norm.
Proof. Since qi ≤ 1, Lemma 2 implies h>∇2ω(q)h ≥
∑
j∈SQ
∑
i∈Ij h
2
i = ‖h‖22 for all q ∈ ri (Q) and
for all h ∈ Rn. Because the dilated entropy function ω(q) is twice differentiable on ri (Q), from
Fact 3, we conclude that ω(·) is strongly convex w.r.t. the `2 norm on Q with modulus 1.
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This analysis is tight: By choosing a vector q ∈ {0, 1}|Q| such that ‖q‖1 = MQ, and setting
hi =
βj
βj−αj
qi
qpj
hpj for all indices i such that qi = 1 and hi = 0 otherwise, every inequality in the
proof of Lemma 2 becomes an equality.
Theorem 2. For a treeplex Q, the dilated entropy function with weights satisfying recurrence (6)
is strongly convex with modulus 1MQ with respect to the `1 norm.
Proof. To show strong convexity with modulus 1 w.r.t. the `1 norm, we lower bound the right-hand
side of (8) in Lemma 2:
∑
j∈SQ
∑
i∈Ij
h2i
qi
≥ 1
MQ
( ∑
j∈SQ
∑
i∈Ij
qi
) ∑
j∈SQ
∑
i∈Ij
h2i
qi
≥ 1
MQ
( ∑
j∈SQ
∑
i∈Ij
|hi|√
qi
√
qi
)2
=
1
MQ
‖h‖21,
where the first inequality follows from the fact that MQ is an upper bound on ‖q‖1 for any q ∈ Q,
and the second inequality follows from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
Hence, we deduce h>∇2ω(q)h ≥ 1MQ ‖h‖21 holds for all q ∈ ri (Q) and for all h ∈ Rn. Because
the dilated entropy function ω(q) is twice differentiable on ri (Q), from Fact 3, we conclude that
ω(·) is strongly convex w.r.t. the `1 norm on Q with modulus ϕ = 1MQ .
6.3 Treeplex width
The convergence rates of FOMs such as MP and EGT algorithms depend on the diameter-to-strong
convexity parameter ratio Ωϕ , as described in Section 4.1. In order to establish full results on the
convergence rates of these FOMs, we now bound this ratio using Corollary 1 scaled by MQ.
Theorem 3. For a treeplex Q, the dilated entropy function with simplex weights βj = MQ(2 +∑dj
r=1 2
r(MQj ,r − 1)) for each j ∈ SQ results in Ωϕ ≤ M2Q2dQ+2 logm where m is the dimension of
the largest simplex ∆j for j ∈ SQ in the treeplex structure.
7 EGT for extensive-form game solving
We now describe how to instantiate EGT for solving two-player zero-sum EFGs of the form (1)
with treeplex domains. Below we state the customization of all the definitions from Section 4 for
our problem.
Let m be the size of the largest simplex in either of the treeplexes X ,Y. Because X and Y are
treeplexes, it is immediately apparent that they are closed, convex, and bounded. We use the `1
norm on both of the embedding spaces Ex,Ey. As our DGFs for X ,Y are compatible with the `1
norm, we use the dilated entropy DGF scaled with weights given in Theorem 3. Then Theorem 3
gives our bound on ΩXϕX and
ΩY
ϕY . Because the dual norm of the `1 norm is the `∞ norm, the matrix
norm is given by: ‖A‖ = maxy∈Y {‖Ay‖∗1 : ‖y‖1 = 1} = maxi,j |Ai,j |.
Remark 2. Note that ‖A‖ is not at the scale of the maximum payoff difference in the original
game. The values in A are scaled by the probability of the observed nature outcomes on the path of
each sequence. Thus, ‖A‖ is exponentially smaller (in the number of observed nature steps on the
path to the maximizing sequence) than the maximum payoff difference in the original EFG.
Theorem 3 immediately leads to the following convergence rate result for FOMs equipped with
dilated entropy DGFs to solve EFGs (and more generally BSPPs over treeplex domains).
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Theorem 4. Consider a BSPP over treeplex domains X ,Y. Then EGT algorithm equipped with the
dilated entropy DGF with weights βj = 2+
∑dj
r=1 2
r(MXj ,r−1) for all j ∈ SX and the corresponding
setup for Y will return an -accurate solution to the BSPP in at most the following number of
iterations:
maxi,j |Ai,j |
√
M2X 2dX+2M
2
Y2dY+2 logm

.
This rate in Theorem 4, to our knowledge, establishes the state-of-the-art for FOMs with O(1 )
convergence rate for EFGs.
7.1 Improvements in extensive-form game convergence rate
The ratio Ωϕ of set diameter over the strong convexity parameter is important for FOMs that rely
on a prox function, such as EGT and MP. Compared to the rate obtained by [Kroer et al., 2015],
we get the following improvement: for simplicity, assume that the number of actions available at
each information set is on average a, then our bound improves the convergence rate of [Kroer et al.,
2015] by a factor of Ω(dX · adX + dY · adY ).
As mentioned previously, Hoda et al. [2010] proved only explicit bounds for the special case
of uniform treeplexes that are constructed as follows: 1) A base treeplex Qb along with a subset
of b indices from it for branching operations is chosen. 2) At each depth d, a Cartesian product
operation of size k is applied. 3) Each element in a Cartesian product is an instance of the base
treeplex with a size b branching operation leading to depth d − 1 uniform treeplexes constructed
in the same way. Given bounds Ωb, ϕb for the base treeplex, the bound of Hoda et al. [2010] for
a uniform treeplex with d uniform treeplex levels (note that the total depth of the constructed
treeplex is d · dQb , where dQb is the depth of the base treeplex Qb) is
Ω
ϕ
≤ O
(
b2d−2k2d+2d2M2Qb
Ωb
ϕb
)
.
Then when the base treeplex is a simplex of dimension m, their bound for the dilated entropy on
a uniform treeplex Q becomes
Ω
ϕ
≤ O
(
|SQ|2 d2Q logm
)
.
Even for the special case of a uniform treeplex with a base simplex, comparing Theorem 3 to their
bound, we see that our general bound improves the associated constants by exchanging O(|SQ|2 d2Q)
with O(M2Q2
dQ). Since MQ does not depend on the branching operation in the treeplex, whereas
|SQ| does, these are also the first bounds to remove an exponential dependence on the branching
operation (we have only a logarithmic dependence). In Example 1 we showed that there exist
games where MQ =
√|SQ|, and in general MQ is much smaller than |SQ|. Consequently, our
results establish the best known convergence results for all FOMs based on dilated entropy DGF
such as EGT, MP, and stochastic variants of BSPP algorithms.
CFR, CFR+, and EGT all need to keep track of a constant number of current and/or average
iterates, so the memory usage of all three algorithms is of the same order; when gradients are
computed using an iterative approach as opposed to storing matrices or matrix decompositions, each
algorithm requires a constant times the number of sequences in the sequence-form representation.
Therefore, we compare mainly the number of iterations required by each algorithm. Since the
theoretical properties of CFR and CFR+ are comparable, we compare to CFR, with all statements
being valid for CFR+ as well.
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CFR has a O( 1
2
) convergence rate; but its dependence on the number of information sets is
only linear (and sometimes sublinear [Lanctot et al., 2009]). Since our results have a quadratic
dependence on M2Q, CFR sometimes has a better dependence on game constants and can be more
attractive for obtaining low-quality solutions quickly for games with many information sets. MC-
CFR and CFR+ have a similar convergence rate [Lanctot et al., 2009], though MCCFR has cheaper
iterations.
Gilpin et al. [2012] give an equilibrium-finding algorithm presented as O(ln(1 )); but this form
of their bound has a dependence on a certain condition number of the A matrix. Specifically, their
iteration bound for sequential games is O(
‖A‖2,2·ln(‖A‖2,2/)·
√
D
δ(A) ), where δ(A) is the condition number
of A, ‖A‖2,2 = supx 6=0 ‖Ax‖2‖x‖2 is the Euclidean matrix norm, and D = maxx,x¯∈X ,y,y¯∈Y ‖(x, y) −
(x¯, y¯)‖22. Unfortunately, the condition number δ(A) is only shown to be finite for these games.
Without any such unknown quantities based on condition numbers, Gilpin et al. [2012] establish a
convergence rate of O(
‖A‖2,2·D
 ). This algorithm, despite having the same dependence on  as ours in
its convergence rate, i.e., O(1 ), suffers from worse constants. In particular, there exist matrices such
that ‖A‖2,2 =
√‖A‖1,∞‖A‖∞,1, where ‖A‖1,∞ and ‖A‖∞,1 correspond to the maximum absolute
column and row sums, respectively. Then together with the value of D, this leads to a cubic
dependence on the dimension of Q. For games where the players have roughly equal-size strategy
spaces, this is equivalent to a constant of O(M4Q) as opposed to our constant of O(M
2
Q).
8 Numerical experiments
We carry out numerical experiments to investigate the practical performance of EGT on EFGs
when instantiated with our DGF.
We test these algorithms on a scaled up variant of the poker game Leduc holdem [Southey et al.,
2005], a benchmark problem in the imperfect-information game-solving community. In our version,
the deck consists of k pairs of cards 1 . . . k, for a total deck size of 2k. Each player initially pays
one chip to the pot, and is dealt a single private card. After a round of betting, a community card
is dealt face up. After a subsequent round of betting, if neither player has folded, both players
reveal their private cards. If either player pairs their card with the community card they win the
pot. Otherwise, the player with the highest private card wins. In the event both players have the
same private card, they draw and split the pot.
First, we investigate the impact of applying the weights used in recurrence (6), as compared
to the previous scheme introduced in Kroer et al. [2015]. To instantiate recurrence (6) we have to
choose a way to set βj relative to αj . Experimentally, we found that the best way to instantiate
the recurrence is to use βj = αj for all j, in spite of the strict inequality required for our proof.
This scheme will henceforth be referred to as new weights. We compare these new weights to the
weights used in Kroer et al. [2015] (henceforth referred to as old weights). Figure 2 shows the result
of running EGT with the old and the new weights. For both the old and the new weights, we found
that the scalars MQ and |SQ| applied to each DGF in order to achieve strong convexity modulus 1
according to Corollary 1 and Theorem 5.4 of Kroer et al. [2015], respectively, are too conservative.
Instead, we show the results after tuning these parameters for the corresponding algorithms to
yield the best results for each weight scheme. Anecdotally, we found that the old weights are more
sensitive and more difficult to tune. The performance also seems more jittery; this is evident even in
the strongest parameter we found (especially noticeable on 10, 16, and 30-card Leduc in Figure 2).
We compare the performance of EGT to that of CFR and CFR+ algorithms on a scaled up
variant of the poker game Leduc hold’em [Southey et al., 2005], a benchmark problem in the
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Figure 2: Regret as a function of the number of iterations for EGT with our weighting scheme
(EGT new) and with the weighting scheme from Kroer et al. [2015] (EGT old). Both axes are on
a log scale.
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Figure 3: Regret as a function of the number of tree traversals in four different variants of Leduc
hold’em for the CFR, CFR+, and EGT algorithms. Both axes are shown on a log scale.
imperfect-information game-solving community. In our version, the deck consists of k pairs of
cards 1 . . . k, for a total deck size of 2k. Setting k = 3 yields the standard Leduc game. Each player
initially pays one chip to the pot, and is dealt a single private card. After a round of betting, a
community card is dealt face up. After a subsequent round of betting, if neither player has folded,
both players reveal their private cards. If either player pairs their card with the community card,
they win the pot. Otherwise, the player with the highest private card wins. In the event both
players have the same private card, they draw and split the pot.
The results are shown in Figure 3. Each graph is a loglog plot that shows the results for a
particular instance of Leduc with 6, 10, 16 and 30 card decks, respectively. For each graph, we show
the performance of all three algorithms, with the x-axis showing the number of tree traversals,
and the y-axis showing the sum of regrets over the two players. We note that tree-travels is a
good proxy for overall computational effort because the majority of the time in FOMs is spent on
gradient computations, which in our case directly translates into tree-traversals. We find that EGT
instantiated with our DGF significantly outperforms both CFR and CFR+ across all four variants
of Leduc. This is the case across all iterations; EGT finds a stronger initial point in x0, y0 (see
Algorithm 1), and maintains a stronger convergence rate across all iterations.
The performance we get from EGT relative to CFR and CFR+ is surprising due to what the
conventional wisdom in the field has been. In Kroer et al. [2015] it was found that, while EGT has
better convergence rate, CFR (which performs worse than CFR+) had better initial performance,
and it was only after a certain number of iterations that EGT took over. Furthermore, the switch
point where EGT is preferable was found to shift outward on the x-axis as the Leduc game size
was increased. This sentiment has been mirrored by Brown and Sandholm [2016]. In contrast to
this, we find that our DGF along with proper initialization leads to EGT performing better than
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not only CFR, but also CFR+, at every point on the x-axis. Furthermore, scaling up the game size
does not seem to adversely affect this relationship.
While the experiments in Figure 3 are very interesting from the perspective of which algorithm
to use for large-scale EFG-solving in practice going forward, there are some caveats to keep in mind.
First, we only considered number of tree traversals in our performance calculations. However, CFR
algorithms have the ability to avoid parts of the tree traversal. For games where accelerated best-
response calculation [Johanson et al., 2011] can be applied, e.g., poker-like games, this is unlikely
to have a big effect. But, for some other games, this aspect can be important, though note that
Brown et al. [2017] showed experimentally that pruning can be used in EGT as well. Second,
to get superior performance from EGT, we had to hand-tune initialization parameters relating to
our DGF, whereas CFR+ requires no tuning. Development of an algorithmic scheme for choosing
this tuning parameter in EGT can make it significantly easier to apply the tuned variant of EGT
in practice. Third, on another practical aspect, CFR+ is a conceptually very simple algorithm,
and thus also easy to implement. In contrast to this, EGT and our DGF requires a safe-guarded
numerical implementation because the prox operator associated with our DGF requires taking
exponentials.
9 Conclusions
We have investigated FOMs for computing Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum perfect-recall
EFGs. On the theoretical side, we analyzed the strong convexity properties of the dilated entropy
DGF over treeplexes. By introducing specific weights that are tied to the structure of the treeplex,
we improved prior results on treeplex diameter from O(|SQ|MQd2d logm) to O(M2Q2dQ+2 logm),
thereby removing all but a logarithmic dependence on branching associated with the branching
operator in the treeplex definition. These results lead to significant improvements in the convergence
rates of many FOMs that can be equipped with dilated entropy DGFs and used for EFG solving
including but not limited to EGT, MP, and Stochastic MP.
We numerically investigated the performance of EGT and compared it to the practical state-of-
the-art algorithms CFR and CFR+. Our experiments showed that EGT with the dilated entropy
DGF, when tuned with a proper scaling, has better practical, as well as theoretical, convergence
rate than CFR+, the current state-of-the-art algorithm in practice. While our scaling parameter
for the DGF did not require extensive tuning, we believe a more principled way of setting it is
worthy of further future investigation.
Theorems 1 and 2 establish bounds for a general class of weights βj satisfying the recurrence (6).
Then in Corollary 1, we have selected a particular weighting scheme for βj satisfying (6) and per-
formed our numerical tests. There may be other interesting choices of βj satisfying the recur-
rence (6). Thus, finding a way to optimally choose among the set of weights satisfying (6) to
minimize the polytope diameter for specific games is appealing.
On a separate note, in practice CFR is often paired with an abstraction technique [Sandholm,
2010] such as those mentioned in Section 2. This is despite the lack of any theoretical justification.
Effective ways to pair FOMs such as MP and EGT with practical abstraction techniques [Brown
et al., 2015] or abstraction techniques that achieve solution-quality guarantees [Lanctot et al., 2012,
Kroer and Sandholm, 2014, 2016] are also worth further consideration.
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A Omitted proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Consider q ∈ ri (Q) and any h ∈ Rn. For each j ∈ SQ and i ∈ Ij , the second-order partial
derivates of ω(·) w.r.t. qi are:
∇2q2i ω(q) =
βj
qi
+
∑
k∈Dij
∑
l∈Ik
βkql
q2i
=
βj
qi
+
∑
k∈Dij
βk
qi
, (11)
where the last equality holds because k ∈ Dij and thus
∑
l∈Ik ql = ‖qk‖1 = qpk = qi. Also, for each
j ∈ SQ, i ∈ Ij , k ∈ Dij , and l ∈ Ik, the second-order partial derivates w.r.t. qi, ql are given by:
∇2qi,qlω(q) = ∇2ql,qiω(q) = −
βk
qi
. (12)
Then equations (11) and (12) together imply
h>∇2ω(q)h =
∑
j∈SQ
∑
i∈Ij
h2i
βj
qi
+
∑
k∈Dij
βk
qi
− ∑
k∈Dij
∑
l∈Ik
hihl
2βk
qi
 . (13)
Given j ∈ SQ and i ∈ Ij , we have pk = i for each k ∈ Dij and for any k ∈ Dij , there exists some
other j′ ∈ SQ corresponding to k in the outermost summation. Then we can rearrange the following
terms:∑
j∈SQ
∑
i∈Ij
h2i
∑
k∈Dij
βk
qi
=
∑
j∈SQ
βj
h2pj
qpj
and
∑
j∈SQ
∑
i∈Ij
∑
k∈Dij
∑
l∈Ik
hihl
2βk
qi
=
∑
j∈SQ
∑
i∈Ij
βj
2hihpj
qpj
.
Using these two equalities in (13) leads to (7) and proves the lemma.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. For our choice of scaled weights βj , Corollary 1 implies that the resulting dilated entropy
function is strongly convex with modulus ϕ = 1. Hence, we only need to bound Ω.
Any vector q ∈ Q satisfying qi ∈ {0, 1} for all i maximizes ω(q) and results in maxq∈Q ω(q) = 0.
For the minimum value, consider any q ∈ ri (Q). Applying the well-known lower bound of − logm
for the negative entropy function on an m-dimensional simplex, we have
ω(q) =
∑
j∈SQ
βjqpj
∑
i∈Ij
qi
qpj
log
qi
qpj
≥ −
∑
j∈SQ
βjqpj logm = −
dQ∑
d=0
∑
j∈SQ:dj=d
βjqpj logm
= −
dQ∑
d=1
∑
j∈SQ:dj=d
βjqpj logm−
∑
j∈SQ:dj=0
βjqpj logm
= −MQ logm
dQ∑
d=1
∑
j∈SQ:dj=d
qpj
(
2 +
d∑
r=1
2r(MQj ,r − 1)
)
−MQ
∑
j∈SQ:dj=0
2qpj logm
≥ −MQ logm
dQ∑
d=1
∑
j∈SQ:dj=d
qpjMQj
d∑
r=1
2r − 2MQ logm
∑
j∈SQ:dj=0
qpj , (14)
22
where the last inequality follows because for each j ∈ SQ with dj = 0, the definition of MQ im-
plies
∑
j∈SQ:dj=0 qpj ≤MQ, and for each j ∈ SQ with dj = d ≥ 1, we have 2+
∑d
r=1 2
r(MQj ,r−1) ≤∑d
r=1 2
rMQj ,r ≤
∑d
r=1 2
rMQj sinceMQj,r ≤MQj . Also, from Fact 1(b), we have
∑
j∈SQ:dj=d qpjMQj ≤
MQ. Then we arrive at
(14) ≥ −M2Q logm
(
2 +
dQ∑
d=1
d∑
r=1
2r
)
= −M2Q logm
(
2 +
dQ∑
d=1
(2d+1 − 2)
)
= −M2Q logm
(
2 +
dQ∑
d=1
2d+1 − 2dQ
)
≥ −M2Q(logm)2dQ+2,
where the last inequality follows because for dQ = 0 we have 2
dQ+2 = 4 > 2 and for dQ ≥ 1 we
have 2dQ ≥ 2.
This lower bound on the minimum value, i.e., minq∈Q ω(q) ≥ −M2Q(logm)2dQ+2, coupled with
maxq∈Q ω(q) ≤ 0, establishes the theorem.
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